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RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE AMERICAN LAW. 
r 
II. 
I T remains to examine the application of this principle* to particu-, lar offenses. Statutes have been passed against blasphemy and 
offenders have been prosecuted under them. This, as said in a 
Massachusetts case, has not been done "to prevent or restrain the 
·· formation of any· opinions or the profession of any religious senti-
ments whatever,- but to restrain and punish acts which have a ten-
dency to disturb the public peace.185 To prohibit the open, public, and 
explicit denial of the-popular religion of a c9untry is a necessary 
measure to preserve the tranquility of a government. Of this no 
person in a Christian country can complain; for, admitting him to be 
an infidel, he must aclmowledge that no benefit can be derived from 
the subversion of a religion which enforces the purest morality.186 
It follows that the infidel who.ma~ly rejects all belief in a Divine 
Essence may sa!ely do so, in reference to civil punishment, so long 
as he refrains fro~ the wanton and malicious proclamation of his 
opinions with intent to outrage the moral and religious convictions 
. of a community, the vast majority of whom are Christians. But 
· beyond this conscientious doctrines and practices can cliim no im-
munity .. 1a1 
N () person of Cliscretion in a Mohammedan country would, what-
·ever his convictions might be, indulge in a tirade which Mohamme-
dans would regard as blasphemous. He would know too well what 
the consequences with the average Mussulman would be. He would 
know that his life would.be endangered by such an indiscretion. And 
while such danger of bloodshed is far less pronounced in a Christian 
country, it cannot be said to be entirely absent. Gross acts of blas-
phemy not only deeply wound the sentiments of Christians, but may 
in a rash hour lead to a riot or other breach of peace. The law 
recognizing this fact therefore forbids blasphemy on the ground 
that it is likely to provoke a breach of the peace. It punishes per-
sons who vilely attack the legitimacy of Christ and the virginity of 
* Part I of the article on"Religious Liberty in the American Law'' appeared in the 
:March number of Mich. L. Rev. 
ns 1836, Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass • .206, .2~1; affirming Thatch~r's Cr. 
CaJ1. 346. 
"""Swift Systems of Laws, Vol • .2, page 8.25, cited, 18.24 Updegralh v. Commonwealth, 
II S. & R. 394, 405 (Pa.). 
~ 1848, Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 31.2, 3.2z. 
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his mother.138 To hold that such an attack is protected by the con-
stitutional guarantee of religious liberty would be an enormous per-
version of the meaning of the constitution. 
Nor is the fact that the blasphemous words were spoken in a de-
bating club a defense. While serious discussion of religious topics 
is not and cannot be a crime, a malicious and mischievous attack on 
the principles of Christianity will be duly punished, even if made 
in a debating club. If the fact that the malicious words were spoken 
in a debating club were a defense, "impiety and profanity must reach 
their acme with impunity, and every debating club might dedicate 
the club room to the worship of the Goddess of Reason and adore 
the deity in the person of a naked prostitute."139 
Similarly the dissemination of lewd, obscene and lascivious matter 
through the mails is an offense which may be made punishable by 
Congress though the offender claims that his liberty of conscience· 
is thereby violated.140 
But offenders against the policy of the state as shaped by the in-
fluence of the Christian religion will be found not only among such 
individuals as are embittered against that religion but also among 
the conscientious adherents of certain sects. Acts done with a re-
ligious motive may equally. fall under the ban of the law. "Acts 
evil in their nature or dangerous to the public welfare may be for-
bidden and punished though sanctioned by one religion or prohibitea 
by another."1n Thus our law,· in harmony with Christian morality, 
extols monogamous marriages as the very basis of society and con-
siders polygamy as "contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of 
the civilization which Christi~ity has produced in the Western 
World. m The Mormon church in its earlier day publicly advocated 
polygamy as a religious tenet. It made it the duty of every man of 
sufficient means to contract more than one marriage. A Mormon 
who put this doctrine into practice was arrested and prosecuted. 
He offered his religious belief as a defense. The court held that re-
ligious belief cannot be accepted as a justification of an overt act 
made criminal by the law of the land and upheld the conviction of 
the polygamist. m When thereafter the Mormon church, despite 
:1111811, People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns • .:z90; 1837, State v. Chandler, .:z Del. (.:z Har.) 
553 •. 
no 1824, Updegrath v. Commonwealth, II S. & R. 394, 404 (Pa.). 
1'° 1909, Knnwles v. lJnited States, 170 Fed. 409; 95 C. C. A. 579. 
1u 1853, Bloom v. Richards, .:z Ohio St. 38;<, 391. 
tu 1889, Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 49; 34 L. Ed. 478; 10 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 79.:z. 
1'" 1878, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145; .:zs L. Ed. 244. 
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this decisfon, continued its teaching and encouragement of polygamy, 
it was dissolved by the United States, its property forf eitedm and 
the suffrage taken away from its adherents.145 
But while the practice of polygamy was thus suppressed and pun-
ished, the-law is fully indifferent to any theological docti:J.ne of a 
polygamous marriage "for eternity." It seems that Mormons make 
a distinction between marriages "for time" and marriages "for 
eternity." It is obvious thafthe law has no concern with the latter 
variety. A marriage for eternity is "something of whic;h the law 
takes no cognizance and by which neith~r party was legally 
bound."146 It amount~ to a mere abstract belief in a form of polyg-
amy with which the civil powers have no concern.147 Constitutions 
and statutes care nothing about what men believe with reference to a 
future existence. Indeed they are intended in the American Union 
to protect a man in believing anything he wants to believe with refer-
ence to the future. They do not deal with be'lief s but with acts and 
practices.148 It follows that a believer in the Mormon religion can, 
so far as the government is concerned, by "celestial" marriages or 
~rriages "for eternity" create a.harem for the other world, provid-
ed he is able to avoid more than one terrestial marriage at any one 
time. 
A peculiar tenet maintained by the Christian Scientists has re-
ceived considerable discussion in various journals,149 has even been 
tr.eated in a separate monograph,150 and has come before the courts 
in a number of cases. It is well known that these religionists believe 
that all the ills of the body can be cured by prayer. With this belief 
the law finds no faul~; Christian Scientists, like other sectarians, 
have the full and untrammelled right to believe in such doctrines as 
they choose and to propagate them even after their death.151 They 
may form religious corporatfons even under the very restricted pow-
1ff 1889, Mormon Church v. United Stales, supra; 1893, United States v. Mormon 
Churcli, 150 U. S. I45· 
''" 1892, United States v. Late Corporation of Latter Day Saints, 8 Utah 310; 3I Pac. 
436; I889, Wooley v. Watkins, 2 Idaho 590; 22 Pac. Io2; 1890, Davis v. Beason, I33 
U. S. 333; 33 L. Ed. 637; IO Sup. Ct. Rep. 299. 
, .. I902, Hilton v. Roylance, 25 Utah 120, 142; 69 Pac. 660; 58 L. R. A. 723. 
1'T Zane J. in, I892, United States v. Late Corporation of Latter Day Saints, 8 Utah 
. 310, 348; 31 Pac. 436. 
'" 1908, Toncray v. Budge, 14 Idaho 621, 652; 95 Pac. 26. 
1" See 59 Alb. L. J. 305; 62 Alb. L. J. 358; 2 Law Notes I42; I8 Law Notes 81; 17 
Med. Leg. Jour. 175, I81, 186, 192, I96; 168 N. Am. Rev. 345; 61 U. of Pa. Rev. 259; 
IO Va. L. Reg. 285. 
""' Christian Science, An Exposition, by William A. Purrington, published in I900. 
= I9i2, G{over v. Baker, 76 N. H. 393; 83 Atl. 916. 
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ers conferred by the Missouri constitution.152 But when they add 
the unauthorized practice of medicine to their forms of worship and 
thus come into conflict with the statutes in regard to such practice 
the courts will frown upon them and refuse them a charter of incor-
poration.153 They will not allow them to set up their religious belief 
as a defense to a criminal action by the state154 but will punish them 
for their infractions of the statutes in such case made and provided. 155 
"The regulation of the practice of medicine is a police regulation 
for the protection of the public; it does not interfere with the exer-
cise of religious liberty; it merely safeguards the lives and health 
of the public against the use and employment of dangerous agencies 
in the hands of the unlearned and unpracticed in the science and art 
of medicine."156 Similarly a parent who in consequence of his be-
lief in the Christian Science faith cure allows his sick infant child 
to die without medical attendance will not be allowed to set up his 
religious belief as a defense for his nonfeasance but will be punished 
for his infraction of a statute which requires him to furnish proper 
medical care in such a case.151 
A -practice by the salvation army o; beating ~rums or playing 
musical instruments on the streets and holding meetings there is well 
known and appears to be, in the opinion of its adh_erents, a religious 
duty. In the opinion· of other good people, however, it is a nuisance 
and has been so declared by statutes and ordinances. These have 
been upheld as police regulations not trenching on religious liberty. 
It is too clear for argument that such liberty does not spell a license 
to disturb the £Ublic peace under the form of religious worship nor 
does it include the right to disregard those regulations which the 
legislature has deemed reasonably necessary for the security of the 
public order.158 The essential purpose of a street is for public 
travel and therefor it "may not be used, in strictness of law, for pub-
lic speaking, even preaching or public worshi~."150 Hence a religious 
112 1887, In re St. Louis Institute of Christian Science, 27 Mo., App. 633 • 
.., 1897, In re First Church of Christ Scientist, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 241; 6 Pa. Dist. Rep. 
74s; 1903, In re First Church of Christ Scientist, 20s Pa. s43; SS Atl. s36; 63 
L. R. A. 4u. . 
m 19os, State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 21; 73 :19". E. 1063; 70 L. R. A. 83s; 106 Am. 
St. Rep. s70; 19u, Smith v. People, SI Colo. 270; u7 Pac. 612; 1904, State v. Cheno· 
weth, 163 Ind. 94; 71 N. E. 197; 19n, Owens v. State, 6 Oki. Cr. no; n6 Pac. 34s; 36 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 63j. But see 1898, State v. Mylod, 20 R. I. 632; 40 Atl. 7S3; . 41 
L. R. A. 428; 1889, Evans v. State, 9 Ohio Dec. 222; 6 Ohio N. P. 129. 
115 1894, State v. Buswell, 40 Neb. 1s8; s8 N. W. 728. See notes 2 Ann. Cas. 904; 
27 Ann. Cas. 1221: 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 685; 36 L. R. A. CN. S.) 633. 
SH 1916, Fealy v. Birmingham, 73 So. 296, 299 (Ala.). 
1'11903, People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y. 201; 68 N. E. 243; 63 L. R. A. 187. 
1A 1886, State v. White, 64 N. H. 48; S Atl. 828, 830. . 
1A 1872, Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. 86; 10 Am. Rep. 664, 669. 
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body, however earnest and sincere it may be, will not be allowed to 
avail itself of the religious freedom provisions of the various consti-· 
tutions as an authority to take possession of a street in a city in vio-
lation of such reasonable rules for its use as may have been enacted 
by the proper authorities.160 The question whether such an ordin-
ance is reasonable or other\Vise must be decided· on other than re-
ligious grounds.161 The offense however will not be of such a major 
character as to justify arrest without affidavit or warrant where it is 
committed out of the presence of an officer.162 
Whatever acts may be regulated the governments will make no at-
tempts to reach or shape religious convictions. "We live in an age 
three hundred years later than the eve of St. Bartholomew and the 
fires of Smithfield. The fruits of the age, grown from the rough but 
kindly soil where our fathers planted good seed, are charity and tol-
eration. They hoped their children might possess, enjoy and practice 
these virtues, precious in their estimation, because to them their 
grace and beauty had been denied; and because we have regarded 
the precepts of our· fathers the laws of this generation encompass, 
encourage·and protect all classe~ alike."163 In the very nature of 
things religious convictions a~e beyond 'the powers of any civil gov-
ernment. Th~y cannot be produced or extirpated by fines and pen-
alties, and are a concern behyeen .each man and his Maker.16' At-
tempts on the part of the state to meddle with them cannot but pro-
duce either martyrs or hypocrites. "Of all the tyrannies on human 
kind the worst is that which persecutes the mind"165 Religious be-
lief therefore· is enti~ely relegated to. the qomain of the individual 
conscience. It is not a q~estion to be determined by a civil court 
in a country dedicated to religious liberty what religion or what sect 
is cOI:rect in its theological views. "Were the administration of the 
great variety· of religious charities with which our country so hap-
pily abounds, to depend upon the opinion of the judges, who from 
time to time succeed each other in the administration of justice, upon 
the question whether the doctrines intended to be upheld and incul-
cated by such charities, were cons·onant to the doctrines of the Bible; 
1e0 1889, Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375; Ill N. E. 224; a L R: A. 142; I2 
Am. St. Rep. 566; 1889, Mashburn v. Blooming/on, 32 Ill App. 245; 1899, Wilkes·Baffe 
v. Garabel, II Pi. Super. Ct. 355. 
1111886, In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396; 30 N. W. 72; 6 Am. St. Rep. 310. See 1888, 
Anderson v: Wellington, 40 Kans. 173; 19 Pac. 719; 2 L. 'R. A. uo; 1887, People v. 
·Rochester, 44 Hun. 166. See also 47 L. J. 520. . 
""" 1899, Commonwealth v. Krubeck, 23 Pa. Co. Ct. 35. . 
"""1876, Warde v. Manchester, 56 N: H. 508; 22 Am. Rep. 50.;. 
'"' 1803, Mussy v. Wilkins, Smith I (N. H.). 
us 1 Dryden 246, cited in 1803, Muzsy v. Wilkins, Smith 1, 5 (N. H.). 
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we should be entirely at sea, without helm or compass, in this land 
of unlimited religious toleration."166 The law therefore does not 
presume "to settle differences of creeds and confessions, or to say 
that any point o_f doctrine is too absurd to be believed."167 It regards 
the Unitarian religion as a branch of the Christian religion within 
the meaning of a will.168 While evidence may be introduced in pro-
per cases as to what a person's religious views are without violating 
any constitutional guarantees, 169 this will not be done to determine 
the truth of such tenets but rather to ascertain what they are so that 
some trust or property right may be properly adjudicated.170 All 
religions however orthodox or heterodox,111 Christian or Pagan, 
Protestant or Catholic, 172 stand equal before the law which regards 
"the Pagan and the Mormon, the Brahmin and the Jew, the Sweden-
borgian and the Buddist, the Catholic and the Quaker as all possess-
ing equal rights."173 Because we are a Christian nation and believe in 
the inherent strength of the Christian religion we do not hesitate to 
allow other religious systems free scope. Protection is therefore 
afforded not only "to the diffeerent denominations of the Christian re-
ligion, but is due to every religious body, organization or society 
whose members are accustomed to come together for the purpose of 
worshipping the Supreme Being."11~ 
The question of the religious convictions of the guardians by 
nature or nurture of children has come before the courts for ad-
judication. The decision of this question of course is of the great-
est importance in relati!m to the future faith of such ward!:!. Never-
theless it will not be treated by the courts as the prevailing consider-
ation. The paramount question will simply be the fitness of the pro-
posed guardian, independently of any religious convictions which he 
may have. The fact that the mother of a child is a member of the 
"Magdazan" religion and a follower of one Otoman Zar Adusht 
Hamish who is the author of a book which cannot be recomtnended 
for perusal will thetefore not be sufficient to render such child sub-
ject to depende~t guardianship.m While it has been held that a 
father has no right to control the religious convictions of his fifteen· 
:1111844, Knirtern v. Lutheran Churches, l Sandf. Ch. 439, 507 CN. Y.). 
11T 1836, Schriber ·v. Rapp, 5 Watts 351, 363; 30 Am. Dec. 327 (Pa.). 
:111 1859, Attorney General v. Dublin, 38 N. H. 459. 
:111190.5, Long v. Stale, 48 Tex. Cr. Rep. 175; 88 S. W. 203. 
1ro 1848, People v. Steele, "2 Barb. 397; l Edmonds Select Cas. 505 (N. Y.). 
1n 1871, Grimtts v. Hannon, 35 Ind. 198, 2n; 9 Am. Rep. 690. · 
m 1910, Pttopltt v. Board <Jf Education, 245 Ill. 334, 349; 92 N. E. 251. 
111 1854, Donahue v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 409; 61 Am. Dec. 256. 
m 1902, Stale er rel Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853, 879; 93 N. W. 169. 
1" 1913, Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328; lOO N. E • .892. · 
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year old daughter176 he may apprentice his son to Shakers and have 
him brought up in their persuasion.177 "A man may think as he 
pleases upon any subject, religious, philosophical or political, and is 
not for that under any civil or political disabilitf ."178 Hence child-
ren have been apprenticed to Quakers and Shakers179 and Catholic 
children have even been placed or left in Protestant homes,180 
though everything else being equal, conformity between the religious 
faith of the guardian and ward will be the deciding factor.181 In 
charitable, punitive and disciplinary institutions the state may even 
actually "take the place of the parent and may well act the part Qf 
the parent or guardia.ii in directing what religious instructions shall 
be given."182 
It must now be clear that the Ameri~n governmental policy in 
regard to religious beliefs is one of masterly inactivity, of hands off, 
of fair play and no favors.183 "So far as religion is concerned the 
laissez faire theory of government has been given the widest possi-
ble scope."184 "Where two churches are making claims to a plot of 
ground th~ state will therefore not intervene in the. controversy, be-
ing. precluded by its constitutioµ from lending any aid to either 
party:185 The erection of a church building by a colored congrega-
tion will not be enjoined as a nuisance merely because its neighbors 
.fear·that the devotees will· conduct their services in a disagreeably 
loud manner.188 Since charity is a part of religion, the free exercise 
of it will be protected as against the attempt of a city by the creation 
of a charity commission to exercise an arbitrary control over it.181 
Neither Shakers158 nor Universalists189 will be discriminated against 
in Ohio in distributing the avails .of land granted by Congress in 1778 
1" 1843 Commonwealth v. Sigman, 2 Clark 36; 3 Pa. Law J. 252, 259 (Pa.). 
>tt 1848, People v. Pillow, 3 N. Y. Super. Ct. (1 Saudf.) 672. . 
•'l'l 1870, Ma;e:y v. Bell, 41 Ga. 183, 185; 1904, Jones v. Bowman, 13 Wyo. 79; 77 Pac. 
439; 67 L. R. A. 860; 1913, In re Dixon, 254 Mo. 663; 163 S. W. 827. See notes iu 31 
Ann. Cas. 752; 37 Ann. Cas. 361; 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 610 and an article in 29 Har. L. 
Rev. 497. 
m 18n, .Matter of McDowle, 8 Johns. 328; 1870, People e; rel Barbour v. Gates, 
43 N. Y. 40. 
1M 1891, Whalen v. Olmstead, 61 Conn. 263; 23 AtL 964; 15 L. R. A. 593; 1907, 
Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 18?; So N. E. 802; 1913, State ex rel Baker v. Bird, 253 
Mo. 569, 583; 162 S. W. n9. ' 
181 1903, In re Jacquet, 82 N. Y. Supp. 986; 40 Misc. Rep. 575. 
282 18721 Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211; 13 Am. Rep. 233. 
m 1848, People v. Steele, 2 Barb. 397. · · 
'"' 1902; State ex rel Freeman v. Sche'Ve, 65 Neb. 853, 878; 93 N. W. 169. 
,.. 1895 Church of Christ v. Reorganized Church, 71 Fed. 250; 36 U. S. App. 379. 
180 1903, Boyd v. Frankford, 25 Ky. Law Rep. l3n; 77 S. W. 669. 
ur 1916, Ex parte Dart, 172 Cal. 47; 155 Pac. 63, 66. 
us 1825, State v. Trustees of Township 4, 2 Ohio 108. 
180 1834, Stale v. Trustees of Section 2!1. Wright 560 (Ohio). 
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for "religious purposes." Whatever the personal views of a judge 
may be concerning the principles and ceremonies of the Shaker so-
ciety, whether thei:i; adherents to his mind smatter of fanaticism or 
not, he has no right to act upon such individual opinion in adminis-
tering justice.100 
There are certain ceremonies connected with the various religious 
systems which in the opinion of their adherents are important and 
which in some cases ;i.re regarded as sacraments. It is clear that any 
restrictive action taken against such ceremonies would be felt as a 
severe blow to and a serious infraction of the liberty of conscience. 
Accordingly such ceremonies have been treated with the utmost 
respect in the few cases in which the question has arisen. While an 
exception in a prohibition ~tatute in favor of sacramental purposes 
has been held not to cover a Jewish custom of. drinking, on certain 
religious occasions, wine as a beverage without symbolical, mystical 
or sacramental meaning,191 it has been strongly intimated that a 
statute which exempts from taxation property used exclusively for 
public worship would be construed to cover bathing facilities, pro-
vided that they were confined to the members ·of the church as a 
religious ceremonial.192 In a very recent Oklahoma case it has been 
held that the federal compact imposed on the state by the enabling 
sta~ute and expressly accepted by it and made a part of its constitu-
tion which interdicts the manufacture, giving away, barter or sale 
of intoxicating liquors within the state .and excepts only purchases· 
for medicinal, industrial and scientific purposes, was not intended to 
prevent religious worship, the very basis of our Christian morality 
and public safety, by a prohibition of the sacramental use of wine, but 
was aimed ·at conserving these fundamental prerequisites of our 
happiness by a prohibition merely of the convivial use of intoxi-
cants.198 Similarly the newly adopted eighteenth amendment of tlie. 
federal constitution forbids the manufacture, importation, and sale 
of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes only leaving sacrament-
al purposes 11!1tpuched. / 
Our conception of religious liberty has resulted in a considerable· 
widening of the definition of religious charities. During the refor-
~ 1848, People v.Pillow, 3 N. Y. Super. Ct. (I Sandf.) 672, 678 (N. Y.); x844, 
Lawrence v. Fletcher, 49 Mass. x53; 1836, Schriber v. Rapp, 5 Watts 351; 30 Am. Dec. 
327 (Pa.); 1834 Gass v. Wilhite, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) x70; 26 Am. Dec. 446. See notes, 8 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 909; 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 459. 
1111903, Sweeney v. Webb, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 324, 331; 76 S. W. 166. Writ of 
error denied 97 Tex. 250: 77 S. W. n35. · 
112 188g, Congregation Kol Israel Auchi Poland v. New York, 52 Hun. son 5 N. Y. 
Supp. 608. 
"" 1918, De Hasque v. Atchison Railway ·co., 173 Pac. 73 (Oki.). 
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mation of the sixteenth century the doctrine of superstitious uses 
was born in England.194 This dogma was aimed particularly against 
the Catholics, though it is applicable also to J e}Vs -and others, and 
rests· on the fact that there was a state religion recognized and es-
tablished whose purposes were deemed to be pious while the purposes 
of all other religions were deemed to be superstitious. This dis-
tinction has been applied with such stringency that a gift for the 
propagation of the doctrines· of the Church of England in Scotland 
has been treated by an English chancellor as superstitious because 
the Presbyterian church was settled in Scotland by act of parlia-
ment.195 It was this distinction and the persecutions incident to it 
which induced the pilgrim fathers to come to America. That re-
ligious intolerance which infused itself through parliamentary en-
actmeJlts and judicial sentences, and which procured the law to ana-
thematize different creeds as superstitious or heretical according as 
Catholics or Protestants gained governmental ascendancy was more 
than anything else what our ancestors fled from.196 Under our pres-
ent constitutions an attempt to make a distinction between pious and 
superstitious uses in its very nature must be futile. ''Under a con-
stitution which extends the same protection to every religion and 
to every form a,nd sect of religion, which establishes none and gives 
no preference to any, there is no possible standard by which the 
. validity of a use as pious can be determined ; there are no possible 
means by which judges can be enabled to discriminate, between such 
uses as tend to promote the best interests of society by spreading the 
knowledge and inculcating the practice .of true religion, and those 
which can have no other effect than to foster the growth of pernic-
ious error, to give a dangero~s permanence to the reveries of a wild 
fanaticism, or encourage and pe~etuate the observances of a cor-
rupt and· degrading superstition.!'1117 The doctrine of superstitious 
uses has therefore been eliminated from the American jurisprudence 
as opposed to the spirit of our institutions, 198io "the spirit of religious 
toleration which has always prevailed in this country,"199 is not pos-
sible iri America,200 and can never gain a foothold here so long as the 
""'Statute of 23 Henry 8th, Chapter Io. See 2 Am. Dec. in Equity 2I • 
... I692, Attorney Gen~ral v. Guise, 2 Vern 266 (England) • 
... I898, Harrison v. Brophy, 59 Kans. I, s; SI Pac. 885; 40 L. R. A. 72I. 
w I850, Andrews v. New York Bible and Prayer Book Society, 6 N. Y. Super. Ct. 
(4 Sandf.) IS6, 181; reversed on a technicality, 8 N. Y. (4 Seid.) 559· 
211 1883, In re Hagenmeyer, 12 Ahh. N. C. 432; 2 Dem. Sur. 87, 90 (N. Y.); I886, 
Appeal of Seibert, 6 Atl. 105 (Pa.). • 
.., 1898, Harrison v. Brophy, supra. , 
..,, I832, Methodist Church v. Remmington, l Watts 219, 225; 26 Am. Dec. 61 (Pa.); 
1910, In re Kavanaugh, 143 Wis. 90, 96; 126 N. W. 672. 
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courts cannot decide tha'.t any particular religion is the true re-
ligion. 201 "The recognition which religion generally has obtained 
from common consent and legislative enactments among us, as a 
valuable portion of the institutions of our society, must prevent the 
courts from saying that every (any) religious use is a superstitious 
use, and, by consequence, must compel them, in fulfillment of the 
spirit of the constitution, to declare every religious use a pious 
use."202 
With religious opinion every action which does not conflict with 
the policy of the law or the rights of others, no matter how curious 
or quixotic it may in the opinion of others be, 203 is fully protected. 
The American citizen may or may not profess a belief in the pope 
and the succession of the clergy.20' He may change his religious 
profession as often as he pleases205 and may worship or may not 
worship.206 He may worship in his ow;i manner and may give im-
portance to matters of doctrine and require that services and cere-
monies be conducted in accordance with 'certain forms.207 He may 
entertain extraordinary religious ideas, 208 such as a belief in spiritual-
ism, 209 or the notion that the souls of men ·after their death enter into 
the bodies of animals, 210 without being for that reason declared insane 
or incapable of making a will. He may join any church and leave it 
for any reason whatsoever.;?11 He may be unreasonable in religious 
matters.212 He may preach as he pleases218 and may assure his 
hearers that if they join_ a certai? society their names will be written 
in the lamb's book of life, otherwise they will go to hell.m He may 
acquire property though he has taken a vow of povertyP5 He may 
""11850, Andrew v. New York Bible and Prayer Book Societ;y, 6 N. Y. Super. Ct. 
(4 Sand£.) 156, 181; reversed on a technicality, 8 N. Y. (4 Seld.) 559; 11!42, Attorney 
General v. lolly, 1 Rich. Eq. 99, 108; 1 Rich..Law 176 note. 
,.. 1834, Gass v. Wilhite, 32 Ky. (2 Dana) 170, 176; 26 Am. Dec. 446, 452. 
"'"1826, Waite v. Merrjll, 4 Mc. (4 GreenL) 102; 16 Am. Dec. 238, 245. 
'°' 1822, Case of St. Mary's Church, 7 S. & R. 516, 535 (Pa.). 
* 1896, Smith v. Pedigo, 145 Ind. 361, 378; 33 N. E. 777: 44 N. E. 363; 19 L. R. A. 
433; 32 L R. A. 838. 
""1910, People v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 346; 92 N. E. 251 • 
.., 1915, Lindstrom v. Tell, 137 Minn. 203, 206; 154 N. W. 969. 
""Sec notes 37 L. R. A. 269; 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 89; L. R. A. 1915 A. 462. 
"" Sec note 37 L. R. A. 270. , 
210 1872, In re Bonard, 16 Abb. Prac. (N. S.) 128, 184 (N. Y.). 
su 1872, Feizel v. First German Society, 9 Kans. 592, 596; 1913, Ba.rkley v. Hayes, 
208 Fed. 319, 323; 1816, Riddle v. Stevens, 2 S. & R. 537, 543 (Pa.). 
m 1902, State ez rel Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb. 853; 91 N. W. 846; 93 N. W. 169; 
59 L R. A. 927. 
m 1893, Schlichter v. Keiter, 156 Pa. n9; 27 Atl. 45; 22 L R. A. 161, 
"" 1836, Schriber v. Rapp, 5 W.atts 351; 30 Ain. Dec. 327 (Pa.). 
:m 1886, L:ynch v. Loretta, 4 Dem. Sur. 312 (N. Y.); 1888, White v. Price, 108 N. Y. 
661; 15 N. E. 427; affirming 39 Hun. 394; 1912, Steinhauser v. Order of St. Benedict, 
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bury his child with or without religious ceremonies. 216 The f teeest 
possible scope is allowed him in giving outward expression of his in-
ward religious life. , 
The fact that he is thus free to act does not of course shield him 
from the legal consequences of his acts where he ·has entered into 
a contract, committed a tort, or been guilty of a breach of the 
peace. He may or may not join a church, but if he does join he be-
comes subject to "its rules, surrenders his religious liberty to that 
extent217 and cannot ~omplain of being forced to contribute to its 
support,218 though his religious convictions may have undergone a 
change.219 Where he is a member he may sever his connection and 
organize a church on "other principles but may not in so doing ap-
propriate in his new capacity property which has been solemnly 
consecrated to and is held in trust for the church of his old connec-
tion.22il He has the liberty to leave his church but not to steal its 
property.221 He may interpret the Bible to enjoin communal life as 
a cardinal doctrine of the Christian faith but if he puts his conception 
into pra.ctice, joins a communistic society and contributes his proper-
ty to it, he cannot recover such property after it has been consumed 
by ~e society.222 .He may accept the provisions in a deed, will 
or other instrument, which imposes the observance of some religious 
·rite as a condition of enjoyment, and will ther~pon enjoy the bene-
fit as long as he bears the burden. But he cannot accept the benefit 
and evade the burden.223 He may join a mutual benefit society which 
makes the obsenance of certain religious ceremonies a condition of 
his membership. But he cannot force such society to carry out its 
part of the bargain after he has broken his part. m He cannot be 
194 Fed. aS9; II4 C. C. A. .249· See articles in 47 Am. Law Rev. 5S:r; 71 Cent. L. J. 16?; 
lS Law Notes 81; 19 Va. L. Reg. 949. 
"'" 1912, Seaton v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky. 49S; 149 S. W. S71. 
"'' 1913, Barkley v. Hayes, ao8 Fed. 319. 
:na lS6o, Curry v. First Presbyterian Congregation, z Pitts. Rep. 40. 
""' 1829, First Congregational Society v. Swan, 2 Vt. 222, 230. 
= lS71, Rosh>'s Appeal, 69 Pa. 462, 469; 8 'Am. Rep. 275; 1867, Venable v. Coffman, 
a w: Va. 310, 32+ -
m lS96, Smith v. Pedigo,_ 145 Ind. 361, 364; 33 N. E. 777; 44 N. E. 363; 19 L. R. A. 
433; _32 L. R. A. 838. _ · 
:m 1913, Ruse 'V. Williams, 14 Ariz. 445; 130 Pac. 887, SS9. 
"'"1912, Case v. Dickey, 212 Mass. sss: Q9 N. E. 410: 1906. In re Paulson's Will, 
127 Wis. 612; 107 N. W. 484; 5 L. R. A. (N. S~) 804; lS93, McBride Estate, 152 Pa. 
192; 25 Atl. 513; l8S1, Magee v. O'Neill, 19 S. C. 170; 45 Am. Rep. 765; 1S9S, Boord of 
Church Erection Fund v. Firs.t Presbyterian Church, 19 Wash. 455; 53 Pac. 671. Contra 
1854, Maddox v. Maddox, 52 Va. (u Gratt.) So+ See Note 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) So+ 
2H 18S3, Hitler v. German Roman Catholic Society, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 72S, S71; 1903, 
Barry v. Order of Catholic Knights, II9 Wis. 362; 96 N. W. 797; lS26, Waite v. Merrill, 
4 Me. (4Greenl.) 102; 16 Am. Dec. 238; lS6o, Curry v. First Presbyterian Congregation, 
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coerted into observing the sacrament of any church and even if he 
should enter into a solemn contract to do so, he is free to break the 
contract and for breaking it he cannot be deprived of any right which 
he may have independently of it. But if by the contract a special 
benefit is created for him he cannot break the conJract and retain the 
benefit. The law will not guard a person "in that freedom of 
conscience which would permit him to enter into a contract and keep 
it to the extent that it suits him and repudiate it otherwise."225 He 
may believe that he is of divine origin and birth, a son of the Holy 
Ghost, and greater in authority, majesty, and power than was Moses, 
Elijah and John the Baptist, that he has attained a supernatural 
sta~e of self-immortality in the body by a course of religious conduct 
consisting in abstinence from meat, intoxicating liquor, indecent and 
profane language, lies or adultery committed by acts or desires and 
that such supernatural power has 'conquered disease, death, poverty 
and misery and can be transmitted by him to others who are willing 
to accept his teachings and may honestly and sincerely endeavor to 
persuade others, by any legitimate means to embrace the same belief. 
But he will not be permitted, by pretending to entertain such views, 
to extract money from others through the use of the mails. 226 
There are certain denominations whose peculiar beliefs render the 
performance of certain public duties on the part of their adherents a 
most difficult matter. Such situations have been very liberally dealt 
with by the lawmaking powers. Even before the adoption of the 
Federal constitution Quakers were allowed by the constitutions of 
several of the original thirteen states227 to substitute ari affirmation 
for an oath. The adherents of sects which consider the bearing of 
arms to be sinful have been exempted from the !?elective draft law 
passed by congress in 1917,and this exemption has been upheld by the 
United States Supreme Court against the contention that it violates 
the first amendment.228 Similarly the constitutions of Florida, Kan-
sas, Oregon and Tennessee exempt citizens from military duty on 
account of religious scruples on such conditions as the legislature 
may prescribe.229 All these exemptions are granted as .a favor and 
2 Pitts. 40; 1901, Ma::urkiewitz v. St. Adelberlus Aid Society, 127 Mich. 145; 86 N. W. 
543; 54 L. R. A. 727. 
226 1901, Franta v. Bohemian Roman Catholic Union, 164 Mo. 304, 314; 63 S. W. 
1Ioo; 54 L. R. A. 723; 86 Am. St. Rep. 61I. . 
""1917, New v. United States, 245 Fed. 710; 158 C. C. A. 112. 
=r Massachusetts Const., 6th amendment; New Hampshire Const. of 1784, under oaths 
and subscriptions; New York Const. of 1777, Art. 8. 
2211 1918, Arver v. United States, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159, 165. • 
""'Florida Const. of 1887, Art. 14, Sec. 1; Kansas Const. of 1859, Art. 8, Par. 1; 
Oregon Const. of 1857, Art. 10, Par. 2; Tennessee Const. of 1870, Art. 8, Sec. 3. 
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are generally limited to the members of certain definitely ascertained 
denominations. Any other rule could not but lead to gross abuse. 
Man has no window in his breast through which,his real sentiments 
can be discovered. If his mere scruples of conscience would afford 
him a dispensation, the religious and the hypocritical, the candid and 
the deceitful would be placed upon the same footing. It would be 
impossible fo distinguish between the pious plea of a saint and the 
black lie of a sinner. The most dogged unwillingness, the most per-
verse obstinacy and the most unpatriotic selfishness might be the 
· mainspring of a claim for exemption dripping with oily asservations 
·· of religious scruples. It has therefore been held that while a jury-
man may be excused in a murder case on account of his conscientious 
scruples against the death penalty,230 or in a bigamy case on account 
of his belief in Mormonism, 231 he will not be excused from his duty 
as a grand juror merely because he is a Covenanter and as such be-
lieves that it would be a sin for him thus to act.282 A fixed and scru-
pulous moral objection to the discharge of a duty required by law 
which springs conscientiously from the religious tenets of a person 
does_. the!efore not exempt hini from its performance even though 
such objection but reflects the public teaching of the denomination 
of which the objector is a member. In the absence of a positive leg-
islative exemption such as has been granted to clergymen and theo-
logical students by the selective draft law of 19I7 and which has been 
upheld by the United States Supreme Court233 even clergymen have 
been held not to- be exempt from jurym and patrol2~5 duty. Impera-
tive public needs must take precedence over private conscientious 
scruples. - · -
One aspect of the subject of this chapter as to which the courts 
have faltered miserably must be noted. It was decided by the United 
States Supreme Court in 1871 that the ·decisions of ecclesiastical 
courts are binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance even where 
such tribunals have actually exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon 
them by the social compact, the contract between the members by. 
which the church has come into existence.286 While some courts 
have sought to distinguish this case, without however being able to 
point to a real diffe~ence, othe~s have blindly followed it even where 
:so 1828, Commonwealth v. Lesher, 17 S. & R. 155 (Pa.). 
:m 1880, Miles v. United States, 103 U. S. 304; 26 L. Ed. 481, reversing 2 Utah 19· 
. = 1823, State v. Wilson, 13 S. C. Law (2 McCord) 393. 
= 1918, Arver v. United States, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159, 165 • 
... 1864, King v. Daniel, xx Fla. 91. 
235 1834, Commonwealth v. Bussell, 33 Mass. 153· 
""1871, Watson v. Jones, .so U. S. (13 Wall.) 679; 20 L. Ed. 666. 
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it led to gross injustice, while only a few have dared to disregard it 
completely. In consequence this portion of the law has become a 
perfect jungle, a wilderness of cases, a river of doubt and a despair 
to all concerned. It will not be attempted in this chapter to discuss 
the situation that has arisen.287 Suffice it to say that the decision 
places in the hands of church judicato.ries a tyrannical power which 
is inconsistent with the rights of the parties that come before them 
and that it destroys religious liberty pro tanto instead of protecting 
it. 
The duty of the state _to protect religious 'liberty is positive as 
well as negative. The government does not merely allow religious 
organizations to shift for themselves as best they may but acts 
affinpatively to secure to them the fullest possible freedom. . Its 
policy is to encourage and advance religion.288 The situation of un-
incorporated church bodies was at an early date found to be highly 
unsatisfactory. Churches have therefore been incorporated at 
first by special acts, later, under general incorporation statutes. The 
formalities required of them under such statutes have been gener-
ally made extremely simple, consisting frequently merely of the fil-
ing with some designated officer of some certificate, affidavit or simi-
lar paper whose form has even been suggested by the law .. In some 
states separate statutes have been enacted, adapted each to a particu'.. 
lar denomination, and their validity has been sustained by the 
courts. 239 The policy of the states has been to frame this legislation so 
that each denomination "may have an equal right to exercise religious 
profession and worship, and to support and maintain its ministers, 
_teachers and institutions in accordance with its own practice, rules 
and discipline."2' 0 · 
Incorporation therefore does not change the ecclesiastical status 
of congregations. It merely gives them a more adyantageous civil 
status241 and secures to them "that religious freedom which Ameri-
can constitutions guarantee."2'2 It leaves the subject of religion 
free· from legal restraint and assistance and allows the various 
churches to pursue their own ways unaided and unrestricte~ by law, 
m See the Chapter on Church Decisions in the author's hook, "American Civil Church 
Law," in which the matter is discussed in detaiL 
... 1886, First M. E. Church v. Atlanta, 76 Ga. 181. 
230 1851, Smith v. Bonhoof, 2 Mich. n5; 1910, St. Hyacinth Congregation v. Borucki, 
141 Wis. 205; 124 N. W. 284; 1888, Keith and Pe"y Coal Company v. Bingham, 97 Mo. 
196; 10 S. W. 32; 1898, Roberts v. Bradfield, 12 App. D. C. 453. 
"° 1897, State v. Getty, 69 Conn. 286; 37 Atl. 687 • .' 
211 1862, W einbrenner v. Colder, 43 Pa. 244, 252. 
"' 1909, Klix _ v. Polish· Roman Catholic St. Stanislaus Church, 137 Mo. App. 347; 
II8 S: W. II7I. 
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. no one favored and no one dis~riminated against.243 It aids "with 
equal attention the votaries of every sect to perform their own re-
ligious duties,"244. extends religious liberty equally to every religious 
sect,. whether Christian or otherwise245 and enables all sects effec-
tually to accomplish "the great objects of religion, by giving them 
corporate rights for the management of their property and the reg-
ulation of their temporal as well as spii1tual concems."24<1 
Unfortunately, however, not all the states have pursued this 
liberal policy. Though the United States Supreme Court in a case 
coming up from Virginia has said that neither public nor consti-
.. tutional principles ·require the abolition of all religious corpora-
tions, 241 though congress itself has exercised the power to incor-
porate church societies in the District of Columbia, 248 the states of 
Virginia and West Virginia have absolutely prohibited in their 
constitutions the grant of any charter of incorporation "to any 
church or religious denomination."249 Th.is provision is due to an 
early prejudice which had lodgment in the minds of our fore-
fathers. "Religious corporations as they were known at common 
law were not looked upon with. favor by the early inhabitants of 
this country in whose mind ·they were associated in a great degree 
with the;: idea of a union of Ch~rch and State, and therefore the dis-
position was to give them ·no ·countenance in law."250 This concep-
tion induced President Madison, himself a Virginian, on February 
21, 18n, to veto an act of congress incorporating a church in the 
town of Alexand.ria on the ground that it violated the first amend-
ment.251 
The practical effects of these provisions are not at all uncer-
tain. They create a mortmain policy whose reason certainly is "not 
. so apparent now as it w,as at the time when enacted."252 The mere 
existence of a multitude of denominations in a state all more or 
less struggling to meet their obligations none being preferred by 
the government· is a sufficient guaranty against the dangers which 
the mortmain policy is intended to meet. The Virginia policy there-
fore denies a substantial right to unoffending citizens because of an 
academic theory. It forces church associations to hold their prop-
... 1903, State e:i: rel :/'Jonis v. Westminster College, 175 Mo. 52; 74 S. W. 990. 
~ 1815, Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U. S. (9 Cranch) 43, 49; 3 L. Ed. 650. 
"" 1868, Hale v. Everett, 53 N. H. 9; 16 Am. Rep. 82. 
"'" 1815, Terrett v. Taylor, Supra. 
2'T Ibid. . 
... 1898, Roberls v. Bradfield, 12 App. D. C. 453, 471. 
""Virginia Const. of 1902, Sec. 59; West Virginia Const. of 1872, Art. 6, Sec. 47. 
'"° 1903, State v. Westminster College, 175 Mo. 52, 57; 74 S. W. 990. 
2151 1898,...Roberls v. Bradfield, 12 App. D. C. 453, 465. 
m 1907, Miller v. AhrenS, 150 Fed. 644, 652; affirmed 163 Fed. 870. 
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erty by trustees with a11 the vexatious consequences which flow 
from this relation.253 Its extent has therefore been somewhat con-
fined by the action of the courts in holding that "agencies" of 
churches may be incorporated though· the churches themselves are in-
capable of receiving such a boon.254 • 
There is one other state which at one time had been enmeshed 
in the toils of the Virginia misconception and which has but im-
perfectly extricated itself. The· Missouri constitution of 1820 or-
dained that "no religious corporation can ever be established in this 
state."255 A lengthy provision in the constitution of 1865, by which 
this policy was modified to a certain extent, 256 was epitomized by 
the constitution of 1875, which is now in force, to read as follows.: 
"No religious corporation can be established in this state, except 
such as may be created under a general law for the purpose only o-f 
holding the title to such real estate as may be prescribed by law for 
church edifices, parsonages, and cemeteries."257 It is clear that this 
provision severely circumscribes the power of the legislature to 
pass incorporation statutes. It forces churches wliich desire to 
become incorporated to state in their articles of association or char-
ter that the corporation is established for the purpose only of tak-
ing title to the property specified irt the constitution.258 It prevents 
a church organization which has incorporated from merging into the 
corporation259 and enables individual members of it suing for them-
selves and others similarly situated to e~force its rights to a testa-
mentary gift bestowed on it.260 Its operation is not confined to a 
church in the ordinary acceptation of the term or even to a religious 
society as defined by judicial writers, since the provision "plainly 
intends to forbid the creation of any corporation (other than those 
which are expressly excepted) whose purposes are directly and 
manifestly ancillary to divine worship or religious teaching."261 
While it does not include a catholic colonization company one of 
:whose purpose is the erection of catholic churches,262 it covers an 
""" 1888, Heiskell v. Trout, 31 W. Va. 810; 8 S. E. 557 • 
... 1889, General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church v. Guthrie, 86 Va. 125; xo 
S. E. 318; 6 L. R. A. 321; 1885, Protestant Episcoual Education Society v. Churchman, 
So Va. 718; 1907, lordans v. Richmond Home for Ladies, Io6 Va. 710; 56 S. E. 730; 
1886, Wilson v. Perry, 29 W. Va. 169; I S. E. 302. 
"""Missouri Const. of I820, Art. 13, Sec. 5 • 
..., Missouri Const. of I865, Art. I, Sec. I2. 
""Missouri Const. of I875, Art. 2, Sec. 8. 
"""1916, Society of Helpers of Holy Souls v. Law, .:167 Mo. 667; I86 S. W. 718 • 
.., I8f6, Catholic Church v. Tobbein, 82 Mo. 4I8. 
"° 1891, Lilly v. Tobbein, 103 Mo. 47?; IS S. W. 6I8. 
"'1 1887, In re Institute of Christian Science, 27 Mo. App. 633, 637. 
?82 1882, St. Louis Colonization Assn v. Hennessy, II Mo. App. ·555. 
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institute of Christian Science,263 the trustees of the Methodist Epis-
copal Church South, and a bible and training school.264 It is to be 
hoped that it will be eliminated as an anachroµism whenever the 
state shall adopt a new constitution. 
Religious liberty would b~ but a shadow without a substance if 
religious exercises could be disturbed with impunity. The most ef-
fective measures have therefore been adopted to prevent such mis-
chief. ·Licensed businesses such as saloons, billiard halls and even 
livery stables have been required to remain beyond a certain dis-
tance from any church. Railroads have been enjoined from erect-
ing or continui_ng engin~ houses in the· immediate vicinity of church 
property. Individuals who have made it a special business of theirs 
to disturb the meetings of congregations against whom they had 
for any reason acquired a grudge have been forced by the strong 
arm of equity to desist from their lawless course. The criminal 
law has b~en used generally and effectively to punish persons who 
disturb religious meetings and thus deter them and others from 
further outrages. Statutes accordingly are in force in practically 
all the states making such distil:rbance a misdemeanor and ·punish.:. 
ing it by fine or imprisonment or both and cover pagan as well as 
Christian worship,2611 so that all denominations of worshippers whose 
doctrine and mode of worship is not subversive of morality are 
f~lly protected. 266 Under them every congregation assembled for 
the public worship of God is at least a lawful meeting ·and as much 
under the protection of the law as is a political .meeting for the 
exercise of the franchise,267 Says the Oklahoma court: "Every 
American has the unquestioned and untrammeled right to worship 
God according to the dictates of his own conscience without let 
or hindrance from any person or from any source.11268 In regard 
to camp meetings, which, being held in the open air, are peculiarly 
liable to interruption from petty merchants who seize the opportunity 
to sell their. wares regardless of the disturbance which they may 
cause, unusual traffic within one, two or even three miles of the 
meeting· been prohibited by statutes whose constitutionality has 
·been upheld by the courts,269 on the ground that their object is the 
protection of the citizen in the unmolested and undisturbed enjoy-
""" 1887, In re Institute of Christian Science, 27 Mo. App. 633 • 
... 1909, Proctor v. Methodist Episcopal Church South, 225 Mo. 51, 66; 123 S. W. 862. 
,.. 1843, .Rogers v. Brown, 20 N. J. Law n9. 
,,;. 1802, Commonwealth v. Arndt, 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 236 (N.-Y.). 
""11834, United Stales v. Brooks, Fed. Cas. No. 14, 655; 4 Cranch C. C. 427 • 
... 1913, Cline v. Stale, 9 Okl. Cr. Rep. 40, 44; 130 Pac. 510, 512. 
"""1882, Commonwea1th ·v. Bearse, 132 14ass. 542; 42 Am. Rep. 450; 1887, Meyer v • 
. Baker, 120 m. 56?; 12 N. 0E. 79; 60 Am. Rep. 580. 
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ment of his rights of worship while the restriction of the defendants 
in their absolute right of property is carried so far only as in the 
judgment of the legislature is necessary to secure such end.270 
Another illustration of the protection afforded to religious bodies 
is afforded by our Sunday legislation. There is no disharmony 
in the views taken by the courts on this important subject. Another 
"such strong concurrence of opinion on one leading question affect-
ing the general community cannot be found in the history of 
American jurisprudence."271 While the cases usually uphold Sunday 
legislation on the ground that· it is promotive of physical and moral 
health and efficiency,272 and while it has been held that under-the first 
amendment to the federal constitution congress can enforce the 
observance of Sunday as a, civil but not as a religious duty,278 it 
should not be forgotten that without such legislation the observance 
of Sunday would be .difficult to all and impossible to some. The 
din and confusion of s~ctilar employments would disturb all in this 
worship and absolutely prevent the worship of many. While the 
rich and powerful would not suffer very seriously the man dependent 
on th.e labor of his hands would largely be prevented fro~ attend-
ing divine service at any time: Sunday laws have thus become 
auxiliary to the rights of conscience. -Christianity being recogni~ed 
as part and parcel of the law, all the institutions growing out of it 
or in any way connected with it, in case they do not interfere with 
the rights of conscience; are entitled to the most profound respect 
and can rightfully claim the protection of the law making power 
of the state.m It could .sc;:arcely be asked of a court in what 
professes to be a Christian country to declare a law unconstitutional 
because it requires rest from bodily labor on Sunday (except· woFks 
of necessity and charity) and thereby promotes the cause of 
Christianity. If the Christian religion is, incidentally or otherwise, 
benefited or fostered by having this day of rest, as it undoubtedly 
is, there is all the more reason for· the enforcement of laws that 
help to preserve it. Whilst courts have generally sustained Sunday 
laws as "civil regulations" their decisions will have no less weight 
"'" 1878, State v. Cote, 58 N. H. a40. 
211 1861, E:r parle AnclreUJs, 18 Cal. 678, 681. The court in this case overrules its 
former decision, 1858, E:r parle Newman, g Cal. 502, which was out of line with all the 
other authorities. 
":' 1898, State v. Petit, 74 Minn. 376; n N. W. a25, affirmed 117 U. S. 164; 44 L. Ed. 
716; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 606. . 
m 1908, District of Columbia v. Robinson, 30 App. D. C. a83. 
"'' 1850, Shover v. State, 10 Ark. a59, a63. 
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if they are shown to be· in accordance with divine law as well as 
human.21G . 
The constitution of Vermont therefore pro~ides that "every sect 
or ·denomination of Christians ought to observe the Sabbath or 
Lord's day and keep up some sort of religious worship, which to 
them seem most agreeable to the revealed word of God."276 With-
out Sunday laws, indeed, Christianity might be exposed "to the dang-
er of being reduced to the condition in w~ich it was before the Rom-
an world was governed by Christian princes. Though it might not be 
persecuted by the arm of the civil power, it would be driven by 
the annoyances and interruptions of the world to comers and by-
_places, in which to find retreat for its undisturbed exercise."277 
The inconvenience which some suffer is of course no legitimate 
argument agaimit these laws. If this argument were to prevail 
all laws would be abolished and anarchy would rule supreme. 
Where therefore believers in the Saturday as a day of rest are 
partly by the law, partly by their own conscience forced to abstain 
from work on two days of the week their religious freedom is not 
violated. They are as little compelled to worship on Sunday as 
· is any other citizen. The Sunday is theirs "for, social intercourse, 
for moral cultur.e, and if they choose for divine worship."278 While 
the conscience of all is preserved as· much as possible and while one 
state in its constitution even provides that "no person shall in time of 
peace be required to perform any service to the public on any day 
set apart by his religion as a day of rest,''279 Sunday laws have 
therefore been upheld against the objections of Jews280 and Seventh 
Day Adventists.281 
When churches were established and were publi~ corporations 
supported by taxation like counties, towns, cities and villages it 
was but nattiral that they should be exempt from taxation. This 
exemption was retained after the reason for it had ceased. A 
new reason has therefore been sought and has peen stated as follows : 
"The fundamental grounds upon which all such exemptions are 
based is a benefit conferred on the public by such institutions and 
m 1894, Jude/ind v. Stale, 78 Md. 510, 515, 516; 28 Atl. 405; 22 L •. R. A. 721. 
mvermont Const. of 1793 and 1913, Art. 3. 
:m 1854, Stale v. Ambs, 20 Mo. 214, 219. 
m Field J., in 1858, Ez parte N~man, 9 Cal. 502, 520, 521. 
:m Tennessee Const. of 1870, Art. n, Sec. 15. 
200 l8i7, Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 S. & R. 48 (Pa.); 1867, Frolichstein v. Mobile, 40 
Ala. 725; 1906, State v. Weiss, 97 Minn. 125; 105 N. W. 11.:in 1909, Silverberg Brothers 
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a consequent relief, to some extent, of the burden upon ~he state 
to care for and advance the interests of its citizens."28.2 It has 
therefore become the policy of the various states by tax exemption 
statutes to encourage, foster: and protect religious· institutions 
"because the religious, moral and intellectual culture afforded by 
them were deemed, as they are in fact, beneficial to the public 
necessary to the advancement of 'civilization, and the promotion 
of the welfare of society."21\3 
It will readily be seen that it "is easier to admire the motives 
for such exemption than to justify it by any sound argument."m 
Its constitutionality however is generally foreclosed by provisions 
contained in the various state constitutions expressly empowering 
the legislature to exempt church property. One thing should be 
especially noted. Exemption laws are construed strictly,285 as they 
are against common right and practically amount to the same thing 
as levying an assessment for church purposes. 286 Where churches 
are therefore in terms exempted from taxation they will not be 
exempted from special assessments.287 
The discussion of this chapter would not be complete without a 
reference to the question of the quantum of .religious belief 
required of witnesses in courts of justice and incidentally of the 
members of a jur:y288 or grand jury.289 According to the settled 
rule of the common law a witness in order to be competent to 
testify must believe in a God and in a future state of rewards and 
punishments.200 This rule has been strictly followed in numerous 
cases which in turn have led to constitutional provisions and 
statutory enactments modifying it or abolishing it altogether.291 
Since these provisions and ena,ctments have taken various forms292 
a great dissimilarity now exists in the law of the various jurisdic-
tions.298 No attempt will be made to trace these changes and to 
.:189. 
,.. Book Agents of M. E. Church v. Hin.ton, 92 Tenn. I88, 2I S. W. 32I, I9 L. R. A. 
:sa I886, People v. Barber, 42 Hun. 27, 30. 
"" I853, Orr v. Baker. 86, 88. 
,. I912, United States National Bank v. Poor Handmaids, I48 Wis. 6I3; I35 N. W. 
I2I; I9II, People v. Deutsche Ev. Lulh. Jehovah Gemeinde, 249 Ill. I32; 94 N. E. I62; 
I9r2, Gorham v. Trustees of Ministerial Fund in Gorham, I09 Mc. 22; 82 At!. 290. 
,. I853, Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind. 86, 88. 
m I853, Lefebre v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 586; I885, Chicago v. Theological Union, II5 Ill. 
245; 2 N. E. 254; I856, Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20 • 
... I9I2, State v. Jackson, I56 Iowa 588; I37 N. W. Io34 • 
... I905, State v. Mercer, IOI Md. 535; 6I Atl. 220. 
200 Sec note I2 Ann Cas. I55· 
001 See note 42 L. R. A. 553 • 
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classify the states into groups. It may however be stated without 
fear. of contradiction that in the majority of the states no religious 
be1ief is required and that in some even an atheist is now a 
competent witness. It should not be overlooked however that in 
~ome jurisdictions a belief in Divine punishment is still necessary and 
that in others evidence concerning the belief or disbelief of . the 
witness may still be used to impair his credibility.294 This is so 
particularly where· a person testifies in his own behalf. It lias 
therefore been held that the right to so testify is a civil right which 
is protected by a constitutional provision that "no person shall 
be denied the enjoyment of any civil right, merely o~ account of his 
religious principles. "295 
The same contrariety meets the inquirer regarding the admissibility 
of dying declarations. It needs no ·argument to demonstrate that 
the unsworn declarations of a person whose sworn evidence would 
have been rejected while he was alive and subject to b.oth cross 
examination and punishment for perjury would not be received 
after his death. Conversely, where his living testimony would have 
been received despite his lack of religious belief his dying declaration 
should riot be rejected merely because he did not believe in a life 
beyond. The admissibility of dying declarations· will therefore 
depend, upon the law in regard to· the ·competency of the person 
who made them to testify in the ~rst place.296 
. The fact that most of the original thirteen states . in 1787 had 
~ome form of a !"eligious test was principally instrumental in bring-
ing into the United States constitution a prohibition against such 
tests "as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United 
States." The further fact that a smaller number of such states at 
that .date still retained some form of an established church was 
largely responsible for the adoption of the first amendment whicli 
prohibjts congress from making any law "respecting an establish-
ment of religion. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Both 
provisions clearly control the action of the national government 
only and do not in any manner affect state policy. A federal 
control over such matter limited as to area has, however, been· 
established since the -days of the civil war through a compact 
irrevocable except by the consent of the United States, which compact 
has been imposed on all states since admitted into the union. This 
secures_ perfect toleration of religi?us sentiment and forbids any 
... See note :z3 L. R. A. (N. S.). 10:.13. 
• 1889, State v. Powers, 51 N. J. Law 43:.1; 17 AtL g6g; 1gn, Commonweallh v. 
Tresca, 45 Pa. Super. Ct. 619. · 
• See note 56 L. R. A. 419. 
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molestation of any person on account of his or her mode of religious 
worship. A similar control limited as to scope has been born out 
of the same conflict and has' taken form in the words of the four-
teenth amendment ,\rhich prohibits all states from depriving any 
person "of life liberty or property without due process of law." 
While these provisions are important, the main protection of the 
,:American . citizen in his religious liberty still has its anchorage in 
the various state constitutions. These, after very interesting history 
in the course of which the various established churches were 
gradually disestablished though traces of the old order of things 
remain to the present day, now contain three outstanding prohibi-
tions directed against (I) any preference of any church over another, 
(2) any compulsory attendance on any religious worship, (3) any 
taxation in support of any religious organization. They break 
down the distinction between pious and superstitlous uses and 
allow the various churches to adopt such ceremonies as they may 
please. They do not disqualify a person on account of -his religious 
beiief from becoming the ·guardian of dependent chiidren, and 
allow the competency of witnesses and jurors to be judged by such 
religious tests as the constitutions and statutes may ha-ve fixed. 
Where denominations have ~ed scruples against the performa.nce 
of certain duties' they permit of their exemption from them through 
legislative action. In short they leave the field of religious opinion 
and religious practices free. 
One thing however they do not do. They do not allow religious 
liberty to be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or to 
justify practices inconsistent with the peace, safety and good order 
of the state. Neither do they permit the liberty of one person to 
be so extended as to interfere with that of another. In determin-
ing the acts deemed to be detrimental to society the prevailing 
moral conceptions of th<: people of the Vnited States which are 
Christian in character will of course have a most decisive influence. 
'l'his fact has led to the formation of the maxim that Christianitv · 
is a part of the law of the land. Accordingly anti-religionists, on 
the one hand, and Mormons, Salvation Army adherents and Christian 
Scientists, on the other, have been punished, the first for blasphemous 
and lascivious remarks made by them, the others for such acts as 
contracting polygamous marriages, occupying the public streets 
for religious services, and practicing medicine without a license. 
Religious bodies would be ill protected if the action of the govern-
ment toward them were negative only. Accordingly the states 
take positive action to ·make such liberty effective. With the 
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exception of Virginia and West Virginia they allow church bodies 
to incorporate and, with the further ~ception of Missouri, they are 
very liberal towards them in this regard. They exempt church 
property from taxation and thus lighten their financial burdens. 
Last ,but not least they protect religious worship by injunctions 
and verdicts for damages, by the pains and penalties of the criminal 
law, by requiring certain licensed businesses to remain beyond a 
certain radius from church buildings and by requiring a cessation 
from work on Sundays, the day principally given to religious 
exercises. 
One unfortunate exception to the religious liberty enjoyed by 
the Anierican citizen must be noted. Due probably to the feelings 
aroused by the civil war the United States Supreme Court in. 1871 
upheld the loyal actiol!, of a church . body though such action 
concededly was beyond its powers. By this decision, which has been 
blindly followed by many courts, -it has given an exaggerated im-
portance to the decisions of church tribunals and has placed in the 
hands of these judicatories a tyrannical· power inconsistent with 
natural justice, with the very terms of the compact to which they 
owe th:eir existence and with the religious liberty of those who 
. come before them. 
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